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 1. Medieval Forest, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Oct. 14, 2011), https://commons
.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Medieval_forest.jpg [https://perma.cc/CGV5-LRLK], photographic 
reproduction from GASTON PHOEBUS, LIVRE DE LA CHASSE (c. 1387). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this octocentenary year of Magna Carta, the title of this 
Article might seem odd. Why ask about our plans for 2017? Baroness 
Miller of Chilthorne Domer posed the same question to the 
government of the United Kingdom in the House of Lords on June 4, 
2015: 
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will mark the 
800th anniversary in 2017 of the granting of the Charter of the 
Forest in a similar way to that in which the Magna Carta is 
being marked this year.2 
The government took two weeks to formulate an answer, 
delivered by Lord Faulks on June 18, 2015: 
 
 2. See 763 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2015) WA4 (Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer) 
(UK), http://qnadailyreport.blob.core.windows.net/qnadailyreportxml/Written-Questions-
Answers-Statements-Daily-Report-Lords-2015-06-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP8Z-PKWU]; 
Charter of the Forest: Written Question—HL272, U.K. PARLIAMENT (June 4, 2015) 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements
/written-question/Lords/2015-06-04/HL272/ [http://perma.cc/W9RK-PT39]. 
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The Charter of the Forest was an important document in its 
own right when it was issued by Henry III in 1217 at the same 
time as a re-issue of Magna Carta. The Charter re-established 
rights of access to the forest for free men that had been eroded 
over the time. However, although the provisions of the Charter 
of the Forest remained in force for a number of centuries, it has 
not enjoyed the same lasting and worldwide recognition as 
Magna Carta, which has had an enduring significance on the 
development of the concept of the rule of law. Consequently, 
while the Government is actively supporting the celebration of 
the 800[th] anniversary of Magna Carta this year, it has no plans 
to mark and celebrate the 800th anniversary of the Charter of 
the Forest.3 
At one time, the “Charter of the Forest,” or the “Forest 
Charter,”4 enjoyed a status equal to its indispensable partner, Magna 
Carta. Indeed one could not be understood without the other, and the 
failure to remember this fact, either now or in 2017, leaves 
impoverished our understanding of Magna Carta’s legacy. Why? 
In failing to consider the Forest Charter and Magna Carta 
together, we lose the former’s commitment to community and 
obligations that balances the latter’s legacy of individual rights. The 
source of this impoverishment originates in the association of Magna 
Carta with freedom, or more accurately constitutional freedom, or 
even more accurately American constitutional freedom.5 And the 
adjectives “personal” and “individual” often qualify this 
understanding of freedom. In other words, those aware of Magna 
Carta likely view it through American lenses,6 and those lenses focus 
an image of freedom that carries a decidedly individualistic parallax. 
 
 3. 763 Parl Deb HL, supra note 2. 
 4. While the literature and sources provided herein use the terms “Charter of the 
Forest” and “Forest Charter” interchangeably, unless quoting another source directly, this 
Article uses the latter. 
 5. Magna Carta, while frequently adverted to by lawyers, is far less relied upon 
judicially in jurisdictions other than the United States. For example, while Magna Carta is 
frequently used to support arguments based upon freedom, the Australian judiciary has 
often limited its application. See David Clark, The Legacy of Magna Carta, 37 LAW SOC’Y 
BULL. 10, 12 (2015) (describing one Australian jurist’s suggested treatment of Magna 
Carta “as an expression of the common law	.	.	.	capable of being adapted to modern 
arrangements”). However, more recently Australian courts have increasingly relied on 
Magna Carta for support. See David Clark, The Icon of Liberty: The Status and Role of 
Magna Carta in Australian and New Zealand Law, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 866, 868 
(2000), [hereinafter Clark, The Icon of Liberty]. 
 6. See generally NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: THE FOUNDATION OF 
FREEDOM 1215–2015 (2015) (explaining how Magna Carta is often viewed through 
American lenses). This is true even in the United Kingdom. See, e.g., DAVID STARKEY, 
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The individualistic impression of freedom found in Magna Carta 
emerges from its famous chapter 39 (29 in the definitive 1225 Magna 
Carta7), which, as understood today, contains four important concepts 
that form the core of modern American constitutional freedom: 
habeas corpus, the prohibition of torture, trial by jury, and the rule of 
law. Yet a fifth significant individual freedom—frequently mentioned 
in modern American case law, yet so ubiquitous in our social 
vernacular as to go virtually unnoticed in our modern world—also 
emerges from chapter 29: property. 
In a string of decisions stretching back almost to the antebellum 
period, the Supreme Court of the United States found, and continues 
to find in chapter 29, the origins of the protection for property.8 This 
appropriation of Magna Carta’s legacy served the early republic in its 
pursuit of capitalism as its foundational economic creed; indeed, 
American law enlisted Magna Carta to protect individual property 
rights in almost anything, including, sadly, even the ownership of 
human beings in the form of slavery.9 And it is in this seemingly 
unbounded potential of Magna Carta to support the protection of 
property even in the most extreme and abhorrent circumstances that 
 
MAGNA CARTA: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE CHARTER 149–55 (2015) (comparing 
and contrasting the celebration and living nature of Magna Carta in England and the 
United States). In the United Kingdom, Magna Carta continues to be seen as 
“representing key values in the legal system” and as a “presumption in favour of liberty.” 
See Clark, The Icon of Liberty, supra note 5, at 890–91; see also William D. Guthrie, 
Magna Carta, 10 BENCH & B. 300, 306–07 (1916) (characterizing Magna Carta as 
“guaranteeing the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual”).  
 7. The chapter numbers used throughout are from the Magna Carta of 1225, which 
became definitive. See DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 429 (2015) (“The texts of 
1225 Magna Carta and Charter of the Forest became definitive. Henry III, Edward I and 
their successors never issued new versions of the Charters. They simply confirmed those of 
1225. It is thus the 1225 Charters, or what is left of them after various repeals, which are 
on the statute book today. The mere existence of the Charters did not, however, ensure 
either their enforcement or their continued relevance.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (“Since the time of 
our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept to be 
the protection against arbitrary action	.	.	.	.”) (referencing Magna Carta); Bank of 
Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the words from Magna Charta	.	.	. the 
good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to 
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, 
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”); see 
also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (2001) (describing Supreme Court decisions beginning in 
1987 involving land use cases that are “remarkably consistent with earlier interpretations” 
of property rights influenced by Magna Carta). 
 9. PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND 
COMMONS FOR ALL 187 (2007). 
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the failure to recognize the Forest Charter leaves impoverished 
Magna Carta’s legacy. 
For Magna Carta’s legacy contains so much more than merely 
the protection of property in the hands of the individual or individual 
freedom at the expense of the freedom of others. Indeed, one of the 
great themes emerging from Magna Carta, when one clears away its 
uses in American law, is the recognition of the community and 
obligation towards others as a balance to the protection of the 
individual and individual rights. But the process of clearing away 
Magna Carta’s use in American law requires a reunion of Magna 
Carta with its historical partner, the Forest Charter. In four Parts, this 
Article seeks to reunite these two great partners through the telling of 
two stories—one, the well-known story of Magna Carta’s place in how 
we understand property and the other, the entirely forgotten story of 
the Forest Charter’s balancing of Magna Carta’s first story of 
property. While we commemorate the first story in 2015, the other 
lies hidden in the mists of time. 
Part I, “Magna Carta as Individual and Rights,” tells the first, 
well-known story. This story, emerging from chapter 29 and told 
successively by commentators and judges, supports an understanding 
of property that focuses on the individual. The story can be succinctly 
stated: the individual has self-regarding or self-seeking choice in 
relation to the use of goods and resources, and that power of choice 
ought not, save in exceptional circumstances, be interfered with by 
others, including, and sometimes especially, by the state. In short, this 
story tells us that property is “individualist-absolutist”: individualist in 
the exercise of rights and absolutist as concerns state interference 
with the exercise of those rights. 
Why does the story matter? Because so much theorizing about 
property comes from U.S. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, property today is often thought of as an echo of this 
first story. Put another way, this story supports the modern liberal 
conception of property, and the liberal conception permits a great 
many choices to be made by individuals, both natural and legal, about 
goods and resources, none of which take account of the way that 
those choices might affect others or the wider community. This story, 
largely created, and certainly encouraged and perpetuated by 
American law, allows Magna Carta’s enlistment in defense of such 
choices. This is problematic because those choices constitute an 
overlooked aspect of many of the problems we face in modern global 
life. Part I recounts the role of such choices in just one of many global 
problems: anthropogenic climate change. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1431 (2016) 
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But this first story, like the conception of property it is said to 
support, represents only half the story—for property is in fact 
relational, an understanding of property that Magna Carta’s legacy 
can also support in its second story. And so Part II tells that second, 
forgotten story: the story of the Forest Charter. Yet it is not easy—the 
fading from memory of the Forest Charter’s role in the legacy of 
Magna Carta is almost complete. To take but two examples of this 
fading, over the summer of 2015, while in the United Kingdom, I 
visited the British Library and Salisbury Cathedral, which together 
hold three of the four original copies of Magna Carta 1215; both had 
major exhibitions for the eight hundredth anniversary. The British 
Library exhibition mentioned the Forest Charter in just one display, 
while Salisbury Cathedral’s exhibition made no mention at all. 
Indeed, if one was not aware of it, one could easily have left both 
exhibitions without ever knowing that the Forest Charter was at one 
time the co-equal “sister” of Magna Carta, and at the very least a 
central component of its legacy. At some point in the last eight 
hundred years, the Forest Charter’s story was lost; why it was lost 
may itself be lost to us today. In reuniting the Forest Charter with the 
first story, we rediscover a long-forgotten legacy of Magna Carta for 
property. 
What then has been lost in our forgetting of the Forest Charter? 
Simply this: community and obligation—the balance of the individual 
and rights—which in essence forms the core of a relational 
understanding of property. In other words, historically, Magna Carta 
had its own balance—the Forest Charter. In losing that important 
counterbalance to the first story, much of what American law tells us 
about the support Magna Carta gives to the modern, liberal, 
individualist-absolutist conception of property is misleading. It is 
misleading because it leaves out the balance of community and 
obligation to the community and others. It misleads because it denies 
much of what we know about property today. It is not solely about 
the individual exercising rights in a self-regarding way; it is also about 
relationship, which means that it is about considering the other, the 
community, and the obligations that we owe towards the other and to 
community in exercising the rights conferred by property. We forget 
both documents, read together, at the peril of losing a fundamental 
component of Magna Carta’s legacy for property. The whole story of 
Magna Carta’s legacy for property includes both stories. 
Part III offers three concluding reflections on what the Forest 
Charter’s twin notions of community and obligation could mean for 
our contemporary understanding of property. With the proliferation 
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of contemporary theorizing about property, the reunion of these two 
great historical partners is both necessary and overdue for two 
reasons. First, it dispels misconceptions about Magna Carta’s true 
legacy. Second, in rediscovering the community and obligation that 
balances Magna Carta’s focus on the individual and rights, we allow 
its legacy to tell an entirely different story, one much more in keeping 
with its original public meaning about the nature of property. This 
alternative image of private property may serve as the foundation for 
a new perception of the environment and our place within it, 
responding to the causes and ameliorating the effects of climate 
change. Part IV concludes, suggesting that a new metaphor calls us to 
reassess Magna Carta’s story of property. We have no better 
opportunity to reassess this story than with the eight-hundredth 
anniversary of the Forest Charter in 2017. 
I.  THE FIRST STORY OF PROPERTY: MAGNA CARTA AS INDIVIDUAL 
AND RIGHTS 
A. The Popular Perception 
American law tells the first story, which enlists Magna Carta’s 
legacy in support of the modern liberal conception of property—a 
conception that focuses on individual liberty and freedom as the core 
of property. The story’s origins lie in those chapters of Magna Carta 
that appear to guarantee property rights.10 Chapters 19 and 21 read: 
19. No constable or his bailiff shall take the corn or other 
chattels of anyone who is not of the vill where the castle is 
situated unless he pays on the spot in cash for them or can delay 
payment by arrangement with the seller; if the seller is of that 
vill [then] he shall pay within forty days. 
.	.	.	. 
21. No sheriff, or bailiff of ours, or other person shall take 
anyone’s horses or carts for transport work unless he pays for 
them at the old-established rates, namely at ten pence a day for 
 
 10. The two classic and definitive authorities on Magna Carta are by J.	C. Holt and 
William Sharp McKechnie. J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 9–12 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the 
history of Magna Carta); WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 3–36 (2d ed. 1914) (providing a 
chapter-by-chapter commentary). The first complete, chapter-by-chapter commentary on 
Magna Carta since Holt is David Carpenter’s Magna Carta. See generally CARPENTER, 
supra note 7.  
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a cart with two horses and fourteen pence a day for a cart with 
three horses. No demesne cart of any ecclesiastical person or 
knight or of any lady shall be taken by the aforesaid bailiffs. 
Neither we nor our bailiffs nor others will take, for castles or 
other works of ours, timber which is not ours, except with the 
agreement of him whose timber it is.11 
A plain reading of these provisions attests to their narrow scope and 
application largely to agricultural products and related equipment.12 
Chapter 29, though, the most famous provision of Magna Carta, 
bolsters these provisions to form the core of the first story: 
29. No free man shall in future be arrested or imprisoned or 
disseised of his freehold, liberties or free customs, or outlawed 
or exiled or victimised in any other way, neither will we attack 
him or send anyone to attack him except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. To no one will 
we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or justice.13 
Still, notwithstanding its broader scope, chapter 29 hardly seems to 
provide the sort of lofty language we might expect Magna Carta to 
contain if it stood as a strong defense of private property.14 
Where, we might ask, is the clear protection of individual 
freedom, autonomy, and liberty as against the predations of others, 
including the state in almost any form and any circumstance? Where 
is the language commensurate with the popular perception of Magna 
Carta’s place in the American understanding of constitutional 
freedom, indeed, as part of the foundation of Western civilization?15 
If Magna Carta supports that sort of protection and prohibition, we 
might expect it to read more like the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, for which it is often said to form one of the background 
principles: 
No person shall	.	.	.	be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.16 
 
 11. MAGNA CARTA chs. 19, 21 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE 
OF LAW app. I at 428–29 (Daniel B. Magraw et al. eds., 2014). 
 12. See R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 333–34 (1999).  
 13. MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 11, app. I at 429. 
 14. For an overview of the strong defence that has emerged from the popular use of 
chapter 29, see LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 170–91. 
 15. Id. at 22, 192. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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While we might expect to find language more like that of the Fifth 
Amendment, in fact it simply is not there. Rather, there is only a 
public perception of its presence. Notwithstanding the lack of lofty 
language, Magna Carta’s popular perception as a general protection 
of rights (including property) survives as both myth and icon, at once 
characterized by ambiguity, mystery, nonsense, and even reification.17 
Over time, though, the popular perception has become the story 
told by American law about Magna Carta’s support for individualist-
absolutist property. It is hard to say which came first, the perception 
or the story; either way, the two have fused into one narrative about 
Magna Carta and liberty. Thus, while one searches in vain for the 
strong protection of private property in clear and unambiguous terms 
that might meet the expectations created by the popular perception, 
the story of that support is told in the American jurisprudence, 
repeatedly, if selectively,18 throughout the history of the republic. 
How did this American story develop? 
B. The Individualist-Absolutist Story 
In England, the story that Magna Carta prohibits the taking of 
property without just compensation can be traced at least to the time 
of the Stuarts,19 at which time “[w]henever an excess of class 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Consider Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a Takings Clause case 
that has produced more opprobrium and legislative reaction than perhaps all other takings 
cases combined, but which mentions Magna Carta not once; although, as we will see, 
mention of the Forest Charter would certainly have been appropriate, and helpful, in 
countering the story of strong property protection provided by Magna Carta in support of 
the outcome in Kelo. For a discussion of the opprobrium surrounding Kelo, see generally 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008). For further commentary on Kelo, see 
ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015) (criticizing the deferential standard the Kelo Court seemed 
to adopt for analyzing “public use”); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the 
Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (describing the response of state 
legislatures in limiting eminent domain power for economic development by legislation 
and arguing that such reforms are unlikely to be an effective substitute for a clear 
constitutional rule against such takings). 
 19. The Stuarts were the members of a royal house of Scotland, the House of Stuart, 
which inherited the realms of Elizabeth I of England in 1603 when James VI of Scotland 
became James I of England by virtue of the Union of the Crowns. See Jenny Wormald, 
James VI and I (1566–1625), King of Scotland, England, and Ireland, OXFORD DICTIONARY 
NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14592?docPos=3 [https://perma
.cc/ETQ7-CKYA (staff-uploaded archive)]. Four Stuart kings ruled the British Isles—James 
I, Charles I and II, and James II—with an interregnum of parliamentary rule lasting from 
1649 to 1660 as a result of the English Civil War. Kings and Queens of England & Britain, 
HISTORIC UK, http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/KingsQueensofBritain/ [https://
perma.cc/R47Q-MA4L]. Following the Glorious Revolution in 1688, Mary II and Anne 
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legislation and attacks on private property shall lead Englishmen to 
place checks and restraints upon the power of temporary majorities, 
so as more effectively to protect personal and property rights	.	.	. then 
the stirring battle-cry will again be Magna Carta[.]”20 And at least in 
its popular perception, Magna Carta served as a source of the liberty 
supporting property, which continues to appear in English law and 
those jurisdictions that trace their lineage to the common law 
system.21 One of the most recent invocations of this argument comes 
from Australia, where claimants successfully argued that the public 
right to fish in tidal waters, subject to abrogation by clear words of 
Parliament, derives from Magna Carta.22 In short then, Magna Carta 
is also seen as a guarantee of Anglo-Australian private property in 
the popular imagination.23 
The story as it is found in English law, however, is nothing like 
the individualist-absolutist version championed by American law.24 
True, the link between Magna Carta and the American story can be 
traced to chapter 39 and the property-alluding provisions of chapters 
21, 28, 30, and 31; but from that tenuous link has grown the cult of 
Magna Carta as a champion of individual and absolutist property.25 
And while this cult emerged very early in the history of the republic 
as a key symbol of individual rights and freedoms against 
government, it was not through any sense of lofty, universal goals 
concerning the liberty of all people, but from the notorious 
understanding of liberty that not only countenanced, but facilitated 
that abhorrent form of property found in slavery.26 In recounting the 
 
ruled as Stuart queens. See W. A. Speck, Mary II (1662–1694), Queen of England, Scotland, 
and Ireland, OXFORD DICTIONARY NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view
/article/18246?docPos=1 [https://perma.cc/W3HG-Y5W4]. Due to Catholic ties, under the 
terms of the 1701 Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 Will. 3 c. 2, the Crown passed from the House 
of Stuart to the House of Hanover in 1714. See House of Hanover, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/House-of-Hanover [http://perma.cc/WB3F-
Z53K]. When used here, “Stuarts” refers to the period of the first four Stuart kings of 
England. 
 20. Guthrie, supra note 6, at 306–07. 
 21. Clark, The Icon of Liberty, supra note 5, at 890–91. 
 22. See Arnhemland Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (NT) (2000) 170 
ALR 1, 21 (Austl.).  
 23. Clark, The Icon of Liberty, supra note 5, at 868, 887. 
 24. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 184 (noting that “[t]he key to understanding Magna 
Carta in the United States is private property”). 
 25. Id. at 179. 
 26. Id. For a full account of the role of property in the context of American slavery, 
see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. 
MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003) and ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE 
AMERICAS (1989). 
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American story, it must be remembered that Magna Carta has been 
held up as a paragon of liberty even in the face of such egregious 
affronts to that very concept found in slavery. 
Although the references are sparse, the American story has its 
origins in the antebellum period. One of the earliest mentions of 
Magna Carta in support of property in the United States came in the 
1829 decision, Wilkinson v. Leland,27 in which the Supreme Court of 
the United States wrote that the “rights of personal liberty and of 
property	.	.	.	[are] the great principles of Magna Charta[.]”28 During 
the pre-Civil War era, the Court also cited Magna Carta in Runyan v. 
Lessee of Coster29 and Perin v. Carey30 to support mortmain and 
possession in perpetuity.31 
The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution, however, 
gave renewed vitality to the story, solidifying its support of the 
individualist-absolutist conception of property. The foundation of this 
support is found in Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.32 
The Amendment has been interpreted as “incorporating” the Bill of 
Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government, so as 
to apply to the states as well.33 For example, in Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago,34 the Supreme Court used the 
Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Fifth Amendment 
protection of property so as to apply to the states.35 In 1947, Justice 
Hugo Black summarized the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment—
 
 27. 27 U.S. 627 (1829). 
 28. Id. at 657. 
 29. 39 U.S. 122 (1840). 
 30. 65 U.S. 465 (1861). 
 31. See Perin, 65 U.S. at 498; Runyan, 39 U.S. at 124. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §	1. 
 33. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment’s confrontation guarantee was, like other constitutional guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights, incorporated as to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 35. Id. at 236. Professor Peter Linebaugh argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment against the states comprises “the most decisive 
legal translation from Magna Carta into American law.” See LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 
170–91. 
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intended to overcome the effects of slavery—in relation to property 
as 
aimed at restraining and checking the powers of wealth and 
privilege. It was to be a charter of liberty for human rights 
against property rights. The transformation has been rapid and 
complete. It operates to-day to protect the rights of property to 
the detriment of the rights of man. It has become the Magna 
Charta of accumulated and organized capital.36 
In at least fifteen cases since the Civil War Amendments, the 
Supreme Court has explained how the phrase “due process of law” 
stems from the phrase “law of the land,” itself used by Edward III to 
conclude chapter 39 in the 1354 confirmation of Magna Carta.37 For 
instance, in Ex parte Milligan,38 “the Supreme Court named the 
sources of [American] law as the Constitution, acts of Congress, 
Magna Carta, common law, and natural justice.”39 In Bates v. 
Brown,40 the Court cited Blackstone’s opinion that private property 
receives more protection in Magna Carta than in the Petition of 
Right.41 In Reagan v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.,42 the Court held 
that “[a]ll the original States undertook to secure the inviolability of 
private property. This they did, either by extracting and adopting, in 
terms, the famous 39th article of Magna Charta[.]”43 Carstairs v. 
Cochran44 held that: 
Every system of law provides that every man shall be protected 
in the enjoyment of his property, and that it shall not be taken 
from him without just compensation. The earliest constitutions, 
in Magna Charta, guarantee that no freeman shall be disseized 
of his freehold but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of 
the land.45 
And, in Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales,46 the Court wrote that 
“[w]ithout the guaranty of ‘due process’ the right of private property 
cannot be said to exist[.]”47 Together, the reliance placed by 
 
 36. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 84 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 37. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 186 (citation omitted). 
 38. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
 39. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 179; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 80. 
 40. 72 U.S. 710 (1867). 
 41. See id. at 715; LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 184. 
 42. 154 U.S. 362 (1894). 
 43. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 184; Reagan, 154 U.S. at 379. 
 44. 193 U.S. 10 (1904). 
 45. Id. at 11–12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. 230 U.S. 139 (1913). 
 47. Id. at 161. 
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American courts on Magna Carta in developing the meaning of due 
process within the Fourteenth Amendment added weight to its 
authority as a source of the American concept of personal freedom, 
which in turn has become central to the concept of private property. 
Perhaps the clearest statement using Magna Carta to support 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections of property comes 
from this 1880 statement of the Michigan Supreme Court in City of 
Detroit v. Detroit & Howell Plank Road Co.48: 
[T]he right of the government to take from either individuals or 
corporations any property which they may rightfully have 
acquired. In the most arbitrary times such an act was recognized 
as pure tyranny, and it has been forbidden in England ever 
since Magna Charta, and in this country always. It is immaterial 
in what way the property was lawfully acquired; whether by 
labor in the ordinary avocations of life, by gift or descent, or by 
making profitable use of a franchise granted by the State: it is 
enough that it has become private property, and it is then 
protected by the “law of the land.”49 
Though only a pronouncement of a state supreme court, this 
summarization of the American story draws together not only the 
individualist-absolutist understanding of property originating in 
chapter 39 of Magna Carta but also the protection of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments against uncompensated takings of property. 
Yet, one might wonder about Magna Carta’s role in 1880 and whether 
it retains any relevance today. A story last heard in 1880 would hardly 
be one worth remembering. 
Not only is the story remembered, but it continues to be told; the 
most recent retelling came in the midst of the octocentenary year, 
demonstrating Magna Carta’s status in the American pantheon of 
property. Horne v. Department of Agriculture,50 handed down by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in June 2015, involved the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, which “authorizes the Secretary 
of Agriculture to promulgate ‘marketing orders’ to help maintain 
stable markets for particular agricultural products.”51 The marketing 
 
 48. 43 Mich. 140 (1880).  
 49. Id. at 148; see also Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 183 (1893); Late Corp. of 
Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 36 (1890); Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 
161, 164 (1888); Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1884) 
(Field, J., dissenting); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 737–38 (1878); Transp. Co. v. 
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878); LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 189 n.14. 
 50. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).  
 51. Id. at 2424.  
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order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee that 
imposed a reserve requirement.52 This requirement forced growers to 
set aside a certain percentage of their crop for the government, free of 
charge, and which the government used by any means consistent with 
the purposes of the program.53 This reserve was used to stabilize the 
raisin market.54 After subtracting the government’s administration 
expenses, the net proceeds were distributed to the raisin growers.55 In 
2002 to 2003, the government “ordered raising growers to turn over 
forty-seven percent of their crop[;]” in 2003 to 2004, the requirement 
decreased to thirty percent.56 
The Horne family were raisin growers who refused to set aside 
any raisins for the government on the ground that the reserve 
requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for 
public use without just compensation.57 The government fined the 
Hornes the fair market value of the raisins as well as additional civil 
penalties for their failure to obey the raisin marketing order.58 The 
Hornes sought relief in federal court, arguing that the reserve 
requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property under 
the Fifth Amendment.59 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the reserve requirement was not a taking.60 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held in an eight-to-
one decision that the raisin reserve requirement was a taking, thus 
requiring the government to pay the farmers just compensation.61 
Thus, any net proceeds the raisin growers received from the sale of 
the raisin reserve goes to the amount of compensation they have 
received for that taking—it did not mean, however, that the raisins 
have not been appropriated for public use. Nor could the government 
make raisin growers relinquish their property without just 
compensation as a condition of selling their raisins in interstate 
commerce. 
Horne’s holding regarding the taking of personal property in 
raisins need not concern us here. What is of interest and importance 
in the current context is the Court’s reliance upon Magna Carta as 
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linked to the constitutional prohibition of takings of property without 
just compensation. A link, the Court says, that stretches over the 
course of American history.62 In the decision, Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote that the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to 
both real and personal property was a 
principle [that] goes back at least 800 years to Magna Carta, 
which specifically protected agricultural crops from 
uncompensated takings. Clause 28 [19] of that charter forbade 
any “constable or other bailiff” from taking “corn or other 
provisions from any one without immediately tendering money 
therefor, unless he can have postponement thereof by 
permission of the seller.”63 
And he continued that: 
The colonists brought the principles of Magna Carta with them 
to the New World, including that charter’s protection against 
uncompensated takings of personal property. In 1641, for 
example, Massachusetts adopted its Body of Liberties, 
prohibiting “mans Cattel or goods of what kinde soever” from 
being “pressed or taken for any publique use or service, unlesse 
it be by warrant grounded upon some act of the generall Court, 
nor without such reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie 
rates of the Countrie do afford.” Virginia allowed the seizure of 
surplus “live stock, or beef, pork, or bacon” for the military, but 
only upon “paying or tendering to the owner the price so 
estimated by the appraisers.” And South Carolina authorized 
the seizure of “necessaries” for public use, but provided that 
“said articles so seized shall be paid for agreeable to the prices 
such and the like articles sold for on the ninth day of October 
last.”64 
Using this background to the Takings Clause as support, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued that the attitude of early Americans up to the time of 
the Revolutionary War, and since, has continued to “bridle[] at 
appropriations of their personal property”65 in the same way as did 
the Europeans who brought Magna Carta’s principles with them to 
North America in the seventeenth century.66 
 
 62. In Horne, Chief Justice Roberts cited cases spanning 120 years. See id. at 2425–27. 
 63. Id. at 2426 (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. (citations omitted). 
 65. Id. (citations omitted). 
 66. See id. (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 
years to Magna Carta, which specifically protected agricultural crops from uncompensated 
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Horne provides a clear contemporary statement of Magna 
Carta’s story of individualist-absolutist property in American law. But 
why does it matter that Magna Carta has been taken to stand for an 
individualist-absolutist conception of property? Why does it matter 
that we tell a different, alternative story about Magna Carta, one that 
includes the community and obligation and looks to—indeed, 
requires—the Forest Charter? The answer to that question comes in 
two parts: the link to liberalism and the harm that follows. This Part 
considers each in turn. 
C. The Link to the Liberal Conception of Property 
Without expressly saying so, the Supreme Court uses Magna 
Carta’s legacy to support what has come to be known as the 
Hohfeldian (after Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld67) “bundle of rights” 
picture of property68 or the liberal conception of property.69 The 
liberal conception has become the dominant conception of property 
internationally in law, jurisprudence, and legal theory.70 To what 
exactly, then, does the Supreme Court link Magna Carta when it tells 
its individualist-absolutist story of property? In order to answer that 
question, we need first to understand something about modern 
liberalism and the place of property within it. 
Modern liberalism concerns itself with the establishment and 
maintenance of a political and legal order that, among other things, 
secures to the “liberal individual” the freedom to choose a “life 
project,” the values and ends of a preferred way of life.71 Having 
made this choice, in order for life to have meaning, the individual 
requires some ability to have control over and to make use of goods 
 
 67. For the Hohfeldian background to liberal property, see generally WESLEY 
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).  
 68. On the bundle of rights concept of property, see J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of 
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996). 
 69. See Paul Babie, Choices That Matter: Three Propositions on the Individual, Private 
Property and Anthropogenic Climate Change, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 323, 
332 (2010) [hereinafter Babie, Choices That Matter]; Paul Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-
colonialism, and the Future: Four Reflections on Private Property and Climate Change, 19 
GRIFFITH L. REV. 527, 527 (2010) [hereinafter Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism, 
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DIEGO L. REV. 323, 342 (2013) [hereinafter Babie, The Spatial]. 
 70. See Babie, Choices That Matter, supra note 69, at 353; Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, 
Eco-colonialism, and the Future, supra note 69, at 530–31; Babie, The Spatial, supra note 
69, at 338. 
 71. See LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984); see also J. W. 
HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 277–300 (2d ed. 2004). 
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and resources. Private property is liberalism’s means of ensuring that 
individuals enjoy choice over goods and resources so as to allow them 
to fulfill their life project.72 
The liberal conception of private property is, then, in simple 
terms, a “bundle” of legal relations (or rights) created, conferred, and 
enforced by the state through law, between people as to the control of 
goods and resources.73 At a minimum, these rights typically include 
use, exclusivity, and disposition.74 For example, one can use a car (or 
any other tangible or intangible good, resource, or item of social 
wealth) to the exclusion of all others and may dispose of it as she sees 
fit. The holder may exercise these rights in any way she sees fit to suit 
her personal preferences and desires. This ability to suit ones’ own 
preferences is referred to by a number of phrases, including self-
seekingness, preference satisfaction, or agenda-setting.75 Or, to follow 
more closely the language of liberal theory, rights are the shorthand 
for saying that individuals enjoy choice about the control and use of 
goods and resources in accordance with and to give meaning to a 
chosen life project.76 
Whatever rights that may be included in the liberal bundle, 
however, they exist only as a product of relationship between 
individuals. This is significant, for it focuses our attention on the fact 
that where there is a right (choice) to do something, there is a 
corresponding duty (a lack of choice) to refrain from interfering with 
the interest protected by the right.77 Rights would clearly be 
meaningless if this were not so. As concerns any particular good or 
resource, then, the liberal individual holds choice while all others (the 
community, society) are burdened with a lack of it. C. Edwin Baker 
summarized the idea of rights and relationship this way: “[Private] 
property [i]s a claim that other people ought to accede to the will of 
the owner, which can be a person, a group, or some other entity. A 
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specific property right amounts to the decisionmaking authority of the 
holder of that right.”78 
Property, then, through this understanding of its relational 
foundations, is not merely about the control and use of goods and 
resources, but also, significantly, about controlling the lives of 
others.79 Using evocative and graphic language, Roberto Mangabera 
Unger puts it this way: 
[T]he right [choice] is a loaded gun that the rightholder [the 
holder of choice] may shoot at will in his corner of town. 
Outside that corner the other licensed gunmen may shoot him 
down. But the give-and-take of communal life and its 
characteristic concern for the actual effect of any decision upon 
the other person are incompatible with this view of right[.]80 
Identifying the importance of relationship in this way reveals the fact 
that property and nonproperty rights overlap. Choices made by those 
with property rights have the potential to create negative outcomes—
consequences, or what economists call “externalities”—for those 
without property rights. At the highest level of generality, Unger’s 
“gunman” is vested with absolute discretion to “[an] absolute claim to 
a divisible portion of social capital” and “[i]n this zone the rightholder 
[can] avoid any tangle of claims to mutual responsibility.”81 The 
individual revels in “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that 
others, whether private citizens or governmental officials, may not 
invade.”82 
Every legal system acknowledges this problem and, in doing so, 
seems to accept that with rights come obligations towards others.83 
The state, through law, creates property just as through that same law 
(what is more commonly known as regulation) it is said to mediate 
the socially contingent boundary between property and nonproperty 
holders.84 This is the essence of property—state conferral of self-
seeking, preference-satisfying, or agenda-setting rights.85 More 
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succinctly, property is choice—choice about one’s self and one’s 
chosen life project. 
Yet more lurks below the surface of what appears to be state 
control aimed at preventing harm to others. Private property in fact 
confers what Duncan Kennedy calls “the legal ground rules” that give 
permissions to injure others, to cause legalised injury.86 This is 
insidious, for 
we don’t think of [them] as ground rules at all, by contrast with 
ground rules of prohibition. This is Wesley Hohfeld’s insight: 
the legal order permits as well as prohibits, in the simple-
minded sense that it could prohibit, but judges and legislators 
reject demands from those injured that the injurers be 
restrained.87 
And those ground rules are invisible, in the sense 
that when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have nothing 
to do with the outcome. But when one thinks that many other 
forms of injury are prohibited, it becomes clear that inaction is 
a policy, and that the law is responsible for the outcome, at least 
in the abstract sense that the law “could have made it 
otherwise.”88 
This brings us full circle to the broader liberal theory, with which 
we began, for the importance of relationship in understanding private 
property reveals an important yet paradoxical dimension of choice. It 
is simply this: the freedom that liberalism secures to the individual to 
choose a life project means that in the course of doing so, the 
individual also chooses the laws, relationships, communities, and so 
forth that constitute the political and legal order. In other words, this 
analysis reveals three stages of choice: (i) in the province of politics, 
where people choose their contexts (through electing representatives, 
who enact laws and appoint judges who interpret those laws), which 
in turn (ii) defines the scope of one’s rights (or choice), and this leads 
(iii) to the institutions that confer, protect, and enforce the choices 
that the individual might make (bearing in mind the ground rules of 
permission, as well as, the ground rules of prohibition). The three 
stages are recursive, for the third leads inexorably to the first, and so 
on. Individuals thus choose the regulation of property as much as they 
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do the control and use of goods and resources.89 That, in turn, has 
consequences for others—if the scope of choice is expanded—then 
the impact that those choices might have on others broadens too. 
D. The Harm to Others90 
When we focus on choice and relationship as being central to the 
liberal understanding of property and to the political-regulatory 
contexts we choose, we begin to see something that was always there 
yet hidden from view. Namely, that the externalities that stem from 
the choices permitted by property create many other types of 
relationships in which the decisions taken by those said to have 
property hold the potential to affect the lives of many others. The 
lives of many are, in short, controlled by the choices of a few. This 
Section focuses on just one specific, and stark, example of this 
process: anthropogenic climate change. 
In earlier work, I have referred to climate change as being a 
private property problem.91 Let me explain how. While the science is 
complex, it is clear that humans, through their choices, drive the 
greenhouse effect that heats the earth’s surface.92 Among other 
effects, anthropogenic climate change causes drought and 
desertification, increased extreme weather events, and the melting of 
polar ice (especially in the north) and thus rising seas levels.93 We 
might call this the climate change relationship, which is itself 
contingent upon the relational understanding of property that 
emerges from the liberal conception. Property facilitates the choices 
(both human and corporate) about the use of the goods and resources 
that produce greenhouse gasses, which in turn drive anthropogenic 
climate change.94 That, of course affects others; as Jedediah Purdy 
says: 
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[Anthropogenic] climate change threatens to become, fairly 
literally, the externality that ate the world. The last two 
hundred years of economic growth have been not just a 
preference-satisfaction machine but an externality machine, 
churning out greenhouse gases that cost polluters nothing and 
disperse through the atmosphere to affect the whole globe.95 
Our choices about goods and resources cover the gamut of our 
chosen life projects, including, but not limited to: where we live, what 
we do there, and how we travel from place to place. Corporate 
choices are equally important, for they structure the range of choice 
available to individuals in setting their own agendas, ultimately giving 
corporations the power to broaden or restrict the meaning of private 
property in the hands of individuals. Green energy (solar or wind 
power), for instance, remains unavailable to the individual consumer 
if no corporate energy provider is willing to produce it.96 
Even more troubling is the fact that the externalities of climate 
change do not end at the borders, physical or legal, of the state that 
has conferred property over a good or resource. Rather, choices occur 
within a web of relationships, not only legal and social, but also 
physical and spatial. Who is affected? Everyone, the world over, with 
the poor and disadvantaged of the developing world 
disproportionately bearing the brunt of the negative externalities of 
climate change,97 which include decreasing security, shortages of food, 
increased health problems, and greater stress on available water 
supplies.98 
The modern liberal conception of property, supported 
historically by Magna Carta, through securing choice about the use of 
goods and resources to those in the developed world, makes possible 
climate change and many more global, national, and local problems 
like it . Yet the Supreme Court’s story of Magna Carta’s legacy for 
property—which seems so straightforward and natural, “extolling [as 
it does] individualism, private property, laissez-faire and English 
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civilization”—is “nothing more than a “whitewash.”99 The 
individualist-absolutist story whitewashes the Forest Charter’s story 
of property, which includes community and obligation as a balance to 
the individual and rights. It whitewashes, in short, the full story of 
Magna Carta’s legacy for property. It matters, then, that we hear 
again the story of obligation and community crystallized in the Forest 
Charter’s story. 
II.  THE SECOND STORY OF PROPERTY: FOREST CHARTER AS 
COMMUNITY AND OBLIGATION 
The Forest Charter represented an attempt to redress the 
inequities of forest law, a body of law that had grown up around those 
areas of England known as royal forest.100 Those origins of the royal 
forest are found in the Norman Conquest of 1066. Understanding the 
Forest Charter’s story of property emerges from its modification of 
the royal forest and its law. 
A. The Royal Forest and Forest Law 
The Norman Conquest of 1066 brought with it the application of 
the Norman system of forests to the new English kingdom.101 This 
system involved setting aside large tracts of land as royal forest, in 
turn subjecting that territory to forest law, a body of law distinct from, 
and at one time rivaling in size and complexity, the common law.102 
But the term forest law belied its true extent and meaning. As to the 
former, the royal forest comprised not only heavily wooded areas 
otherwise uninhabited, but also a range of land types that included 
cultivated103 and “inhabited countryside with villages and 
farmland.”104 In relation to both types of land “the King enjoyed a 
monopoly over all management and distribution of resources.”105 
Moreover, while the king did not “own” the royal forest per se—
subjects could still own land within the royal forest—any 
countervailing rights remained subject to the onerous restrictions of 
forest law.106 As the population of medieval England grew, those 
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restrictions “became increasingly onerous to both the nobility and 
their peasant tenants who were unable to develop or expand their 
land without the King’s permission.”107 
The purpose of the forest law was much narrower than the extent 
of the royal forest: the protection of the king’s hunting ground108 and 
the preservation of food and shelter for the game of the forest for the 
king’s hunt.109 Before forest law, “the hunting rights of the King did 
not differ materially from those of any other landowner	.	.	.	.”110 With 
the establishment of the new royal forest, though, forest law 
superseded the common law of property, forbidding all but the king 
to hunt many animals of the forest, including deer, boar, hares and 
rabbits, wildfowl and birds, and fish.111 Moreover, the forest law 
forbade subjects from accessing the vegetation of the forest and 
restricted cultivation of the land for crops, the collection of wood for 
fuel and building, and the pasturing of animals.112 
Thus, pursuant to forest law, the death of a beast of the royal 
forest at the hands of any person other than the king, members of his 
hunting parties, or his foresters was treated with all the seriousness 
that we might find today in indictable criminal offences.113 Indeed, the 
forest law meted out heavy penalties for violators.114 As the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle recorded: 
[King William I] made many deer-parks; and he established 
laws therewith; so that whosoever slew a hart, or a hind, should 
be deprived of his eyesight. As he forbade men to kill the harts, 
so also the boars	.	.	.	His rich men bemoaned it, and the poor 
men shuddered at it.115 
And Carolyn Harris writes: 
The chronicler William of Newburgh complained of William I’s 
youngest son, King Henry I, “He was, also, immoderately 
attached to beasts of chase, and, from his ardent love of 
hunting, used little discrimination in his public punishments 
 
 107. Carolyn Harris, The Charter of the Forest, MAGNA CARTA CAN. (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.magnacartacanada.ca/the-charter-of-the-forest/ [https://perma.cc/R7YP-NRA8].  
 108. GRANT, supra note 101, at 6. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 8. 
 111. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24. 
 112. GRANT, supra note 101, at 6. 
 113. Id. at 13, 49–50. 
 114. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24 (noting that the punishment for killing a deer 
included “blinding and mutilation”).  
 115. THE ANGLO-SAXON CHRONICLE 166–67 (Ernest Rhys ed., Rev. James Ingram 
trans., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1938). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1431 (2016) 
1454 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
between deer killers and murderers.” By the reign of King 
Richard the Lionhearted, the punishment for killing a deer was 
blinding and mutilation even though the King only spent a few 
months in England over the course of his reign and had little 
time for hunting between his military campaigns.116 
The king’s royal foresters enforced the forest law, wielding powers 
both extensive and arbitrary. Thus, 
[p]ermission from the king’s chief forester was required before 
forest land could be cleared and cultivated, and the king 
received rent in perpetuity for these newly developed tracts. 
The right to pasture animals in the forest was strictly controlled 
and could be revoked at the king’s discretion. Farmers could 
only chop down trees for their own use if the removal of a tree 
did not create waste, which was defined in the reign of Henry II 
as “If a man standing on the stump of an oak or other tree can 
see five other trees cut down around him.”117 
And most significantly, if the chief forester could not identify an 
individual offender, the power existed simply to impose a fine on the 
entire community.118 
From the king’s perspective, of course, all of this was perfectly 
logical: the taking of fines for forest offences produced significant 
royal revenue.119 Indeed, David Carpenter concludes: “[Forest law’s] 
main purpose was not to provide kings with areas for hunting, 
although they certainly were great huntsmen. It was to provide them 
with money.”120 
It is not surprising, then, that the upper classes considered the 
forest law to be more than a mere inconvenience. Not only did it 
restrict the hunting rights of the nobility, allowing for the imposition 
of fines upon them for the slightest violation, but it also crippled poor 
commoners by removing their access to the wild resources that they 
relied on for survival.121 At best, the king’s subjects came to see forest 
law as an invasion of natural rights; at worst, it was “an unmitigated 
disaster[.]”122 In 1159 John of Salisbury wrote that the kings “[i]n their 
audacity	.	.	. have dared to claim for themselves animals which are 
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wild by nature and are made by right for those who can take them.”123 
In short, the forest law “had no benefits for [the king’s subjects].”124 
Still, notwithstanding its lack of support, subsequent Norman 
kings expanded the royal forest to the extent that by 1215 fully one-
third of England was royal forest.125 Such was the perceived injustice 
of forest law, then, that it was featured in the original 1215 Magna 
Carta. Buried beneath the much-lauded clauses sanctifying 
property,126 the 1215 Magna Carta also promised to overhaul the 
restrictions imposed in the royal forests by restoring rights in 
commons.127 King John promised the disafforesting of any land he 
himself had reserved128 to restore the land to public usage and to 
investigate and abolish the “evil customs” of the forests.129 
But the 1215 Magna Carta was short-lived—in August 1215 Pope 
Innocent III annulled the Charter sealed at Runnymede only two 
months earlier.130 While it was reissued under subsequent kings, 
including Henry III in 1216, 1217, and 1225, the forest chapters were 
omitted from Magna Carta. Instead, these chapters took the form of 
an expanded and detailed document regulating the uses of the king’s 
forests: the Forest Charter.131 And so it is here that the community-
obligation story of property begins. 
B. The Community-Obligation Story132 
With the reasons for its sealing understood, we can ask: if the 
liberal conception of property is supported by the individualist-
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absolutist story of Magna Carta, what can the Forest Charter add? In 
short: community and obligation. Or, put another way, if Magna 
Carta offers the notion of the individual and rights as the foundation 
of property, the Forest Charter balances that with community and 
obligation. The key to unlocking this story of community and 
obligation lies in the medieval “notion of having all things common,” 
which was “made plausible by the network of customary rights and 
practice on common lands, which already by the thirteenth century 
was both old and endangered.”133 One simply cannot understand the 
Forest Charter’s story of property without first understanding 
thirteenth-century commons. These commons not only operated long 
before the Forest Charter, but were also jeopardized by the 
introduction of forest law. 
In those areas treated as commons, the practice of “commoning” 
allowed commoners freely to acquire resources from land that they 
did not own.134 Thus, for instance, in medieval society some natural 
resources were treated as available to all persons, regardless of whose 
land the resources grew or fell on.135 Among the resources 
commoners could freely acquire were wood, fish, birds, small animals, 
and plants.136 In some wooded commons, the “soil belonged to the 
lord while grazing belonged to the commoners, and the trees to 
either—timber to the lord, and wood to commoners.”137 
When much of England was afforested, or converted to royal 
forest following the Norman Conquest, commoners not only lost 
many of their land rights to commons but were also subject to fines 
for exercising their customary rights.138 The arbitrary and capricious 
powers wielded by the foresters were, though, eroded prior to the 
Forest Charter through agreements entered into by Kings Richard 
and John “to ‘disafforest’ land upon the payment of a large sum from 
a community whose members agreed they would be better off without 
the restrictions imposed on forest dwellers.”139 The process continued 
with chapters 47 and 48 of Magna Carta, which, as we have seen, 
referred to the “evil customs of forest [law]” and both disafforested 
land (or removed lands from royal jurisdiction, which would 
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otherwise prevent access and use by anyone other than the Crown) 
and returned to the people the common rights of the forest.140 
The Forest Charter, sealed by the young Henry III in 1217, 
sought to complete the reversal of the deprivation of resources begun 
in 1066.141 To achieve this, first, the Forest Charter extended the 
modifications of earlier agreements and Magna Carta by defining the 
“evil customs” mentioned in chapter 47. Second, it restricted the royal 
prerogatives vested in the chief forester to “extract payments for land 
development or levy fines for violations of forest law.”142 It further 
restricted these powers by enunciating significant commoning 
rights.143 Most importantly, chapter 17 (chapter 16 of the Forest 
Charter of 1225) provided that the “liberties of the forest	.	.	.	are 
granted to	.	.	.	everyone”—unlike Magna Carta, which largely applied 
to only barons and knights.144 
The Forest Charter’s great innovation, then, was to extend the 
pre-1217 agreements between individual communities and the Crown 
to the entire kingdom. In turn, this restricted the use of royal forest as 
purely revenue producing, thereby opening a new means of managing 
common resources. This new system placed the community, and not 
the personal prerogative of the Crown, at the center of land 
ownership. In short, the Forest Charter elevated the place of 
community relative to the Crown. 
The Forest Charter’s specific provisions, therefore, set out the 
framework of community and obligation that became its legacy for 
property. Chapters 1 and 3 assured the rights of common to those 
who had been accustomed to them, even in the king’s forests.145 These 
chapters also disafforested vast tracts of land, thus removing them 
from the regulation of forest law.146 These chapters had the effect of 
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limiting the arbitrary prerogative power of the Crown to convert land 
into royal forest, which had so angered the barons.147 
Other chapters protected animals and goods. For example, 
chapter 7 forbade royal officials (foresters) from taking produce in 
lieu of feudal tax.148 Chapter 9 assured common rights to graze 
animals.149 Chapter 10, while acknowledging that deer remained the 
property of the king, provided that “no one shall henceforth lose life 
or limb because of our venison.”150 Further, chapter 12 allowed 
persons living in the forest to “make in his own wood, or on his land, 
or on his water, which he has within our forest, mills, springs, pools, 
marlpits, dykes, or arable ground, without enclosing that arable 
ground, so that it be not to the annoyance of any of his neighbours.”151 
No longer answerable to the authorities and king for development of 
the land, this chapter especially represented a significant freedom to 
use land for the good of the commoners and community, taking 
account of others in the choices made about one’s land. In this one 
chapter, the Forest Charter both revoked unpopular decrees made by 
King John and transferred authority over forest development from 
king to subject. Put another way, in requiring the consent of one’s 
neighbor in the development of land, the emphasis of land ownership 
moved from the arbitrary, and often capricious, whim of an individual 
(the king)152 to one’s community. Thus, “[i]nstead of answering to the 
King alone, forest dwellers had to consult with their communities, 
[thus] ensuring that any development did not disadvantage their 
neighbours.”153 
 
 147. See Harris, supra note 107. 
 148. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 7 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 421.  
 149. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 9 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 422.  
 150. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 9 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 422.  
 151. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 9 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 422.  
 152. And there is no lack of evidence of just how arbitrary and capricious this whim 
might be. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24 (“In 1209, the knight Roger de Crammaville 
of Kent was fined twenty marks for owning dogs that did not meet forest regulations, 
which dictated that three claws of their forepaws be removed to ensure that they were 
unable to hunt game. That same year, John ordered the destruction of unauthorized 
ditches and hedges on forest land. This decree resulted in wild animals—including deer, 
which had little fear of humans because of the harsh poaching laws—destroying crops in 
fields unprotected by hedges or ditches. In addition to collective fines and other payments, 
John also used his forest prerogatives to settle personal scores. In 1200, he expressed his 
displeasure with the Cistercian Order by forbidding the monks from pasturing their 
livestock in the forest until twelve abbots begged his forgiveness on their knees.”). 
 153. Id. at 50–51. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1431 (2016) 
2016] MAGNA CARTA & THE FOREST CHARTER 1459 
Further, chapter 13 ensured that “[e]very freeman shall have, 
within his own woods, ayries of hawkes, sparrow-hawkes, falcons, 
eagles and herons: and shall have also the honey that is found within 
his woods,” while chapter 14 protected the subjects’ right to gather up 
to a certain amount of wood, bark or charcoal without having to pay 
the fee of chiminage (a road tax).154 
In the totality of the Forest Charter’s provisions, some of which 
remained in force for over 700 years,155 we find the core of the 
community-obligation story of property which emerges from the 
Forest Charter. Concern for the community arrives in the return of 
commoning rights that had been lost through the process of 
afforestation following the Norman Conquest.156 The return of these 
rights and the corresponding return of control to individuals illustrate 
the Forest Charter’s concept of obligation to community members. 
As we know, Magna Carta had already begun the process of 
transforming the royal forest into commoning land in 1215. This 
transformation was achieved through chapter 47’s abolition of the 
“evil customs” of the royal forests.157 And, while chapter 47 was 
removed from subsequent reissues of Magna Carta, that was possible 
only because the Forest Charter expanded and developed the 
provisions relating to the use of royal forest. That expansion involved 
placing at least some of the power over determining how land would 
be used in the hands of the community, thus transforming forest law 
into a common law that required a consideration of the other in the 
choices made about land use, ultimately serving the needs of the 
community rather than the Crown alone. 
There is little doubt that the Forest Charter’s story of 
community-obligation became, rather quickly, an integral part of 
understanding Magna Carta’s legacy for property.158 It was soon 
impossible to understand the story told by one of these documents 
without listening also to the story told by the other. Yet, at some 
point in the last eight hundred years, the Forest Charter’s story was 
silenced, leaving the legacy of Magna Carta for property 
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impoverished, said to support only the liberal individualist-absolutist 
conception of property, rather than its original, relational view. 
C. Magna Carta’s Lost Sister159 
From the perspective of its contemporaries, the Forest Charter 
did not so much restore individual property rights to landowners as it 
restored common property rights to all inhabitants of the forests.160 It 
“expanded on [Magna Carta]’s provisions and provided the 
foundation for the modern concept of common stewardship of 
resources.”161 Indeed, while Magna Carta may be the first self-
conscious association of rights and freedoms, in fact, the Forest 
Charter may have provided commoners with their earliest sense of 
holding such rights and freedoms162: 
Crucially, both charters began to explicitly connect commons 
with an expansive and political sense of rights and freedom. 
The Forest Charter concluded with the statement, “And these 
Liberties of the Forests, we have granted to all Men.” This 
expressed, at an early date, the association of commons with 
freedom. It is significant in this regard that together the 
documents were called the Charters of Liberties.163 
Yet, there was real doubt whether the Forest Charter would even 
endure. In 1227, when Henry III came of age, it was unclear whether 
any of the charters approved during his minority would be valid upon 
his attaining the age of majority.164 Yet, 
[t]he King ultimately agreed to uphold Magna Carta in 
exchange for a tax on the movable property of the clergy, and 
the Charter of the Forest for a tax on land. Henry III’s fifty-six 
year reign coincided with a period of prosperity for England as 
land development in rural areas matched the needs of 
communities instead of forest regulations imposed on them by 
the King.165 
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Notwithstanding Henry’s agreement to be bound by Magna Carta and 
the Forest Charter, it would be several centuries before commoners 
generally begun to understand commoning as necessary to be asserted 
and defended.166 This took the form of acts of resistance against 
enclosure and the “gradual popular transcendence of the ideas about 
common rights articulated in the charters.”167 And once this process 
of transcendence began, the Forest Charter came to foster beliefs that 
commons, and not private property, are the vehicle of freedom.168 
Thus, in their early history, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter 
came to be seen as equally important. Each time a king reissued 
Magna Carta, the Charter of the Forest was reissued as well.169 In 
1225 both charters were issued together in what became their 
definitive form.170 They were again confirmed when Henry III 
reached his majority in 1227.171 By 1297, Edward I directed that the 
charters would be the common law of England172 and ordered that 
both be read aloud in each cathedral twice annually.173 And so, in 
1642, Sir Edward Coke wrote: 
It is called Magna Charta, not that it is great in quantity, for 
there be many voluminous charters commonly passed, specially 
in these later times, longer than this is; nor comparatively in 
respect that it is greater than Charta de Foresta, but in respect 
of the great importance, and weightiness of the matter, as 
hereafter shall appeare: and likewise for the same cause Charta 
de Foresta is called Magna Charta de Foresta, and both of them 
are called Magnae Chartae Libertatum Angliae [great charters 
of English liberties].174 
Therefore, when told together, as they were always intended to be 
told, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter tell a very different story 
about property than the one told by the U.S. Supreme Court, a story 
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that carefully balances a system of individualist-absolutist property 
with obligation towards the community. But, at some point after 1642 
the Forest Charter drops out of the popular social imagination and 
falls into desuetude. When precisely and why exactly we cannot say. 
What we do know is that the Forest Charter is found in Sir William 
Blackstone’s definitive version of the two Great Charters produced in 
1759,175 so as late as the eighteenth century the second story of 
property remained extant. What happened? Was the fate of the 
Forest Charter’s lasting image sealed by its seemingly archaic 
terminology and concepts? Some think so: 
Historians have always known the Charter of the Forest existed 
but many of its terms—for example, estovers, or subsistence 
wood products—seem strange and archaic, and have prevented 
the general public from recognizing its existence and 
understanding its importance.176 
Or is there a connection to the dispossession of the indigenous 
peoples of North America, the only commoners by practice in the 
New World? That is speculative, but we do know that at the same 
time indigenous peoples were being dispossessed, liberty and freedom 
were being extolled as the virtues of the liberal individual and were 
central to the American conception of the relationship of people to 
one another and to government.177 So it may be that liberalism itself 
stripped away this memory of the Forest Charter as being 
community-obligation focused, burnishing in its place Magna Carta’s 
image of liberty achieved by unrestricted private property rights. In 
contrast, the Forest Charter saw liberty as being associated with 
freedom and rights intrinsic to the concept of commons.178 
Or the silencing may have been more recent. Examples of 
meaningful representations of rights of commons and the Forest 
Charter can be found in the activities of the “Diggers,”179 a political 
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group in civil-war era England, in colonial America and Australia, 
and even up to the 1890s in Australia.180 Such representations make 
clear that, notwithstanding Magna Carta’s story of property as told by 
the Supreme Court, the notion of commoning and its corresponding 
concept of obligation, may not, on closer scrutiny, be all that archaic 
to the modern mind. 
Still, archaic or not, freedom enhancing or not, the community-
obligation story of property told by the Forest Charter has seldom, if 
ever, been heard in our time.181 Chris Besant argues that “these two 
documents standing side by side express a central theme in English 
history that is not adequately recognized by a tradition of inquiry that 
treats one document [Magna Carta] as fundamental, and [the Forest 
Charter] as of antiquarian interest.”182 Whatever the truth, and we 
may never know why or how the Forest Charter’s story was silenced, 
sometime between 1759 and today, the Forest Charter became Magna 
Carta’s “lost sister.”183 
We need to retell the story using concepts relevant to our own 
time. The next Section offers some concluding reflections on how we 
might do that, again using the contemporary challenge of 
anthropogenic climate change as a means of exploring what the 
Forest Charter story of community-obligation might say to us. 
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III.  REFLECTIONS: THE FOREST CHARTER’S COMMUNITY-
OBLIGATION STORY FOR OUR OWN TIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Green Man184 
A. A New Metaphor 
You may have passed over it without a second thought. Quite 
intentionally, without comment, I wanted at the outset of this Article 
for the reader to see an image of a medieval forest—perhaps it was a 
forest where the right of commoning existed, or perhaps it was the 
royal forest, where such rights had been lost. What was lost or when it 
was lost does not really matter; all that matters is the visual 
representation of lands as they might have been at the time of Magna 
Carta, either before being afforested or after being disafforested. In 
 
 184. Green Man (Thirteenth Century), Bamberg Cathedral, Germany. © 1992 Clive 
Hicks (reproduced with permission).  
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short, the image of the medieval forest captures, at least partially, 
Magna Carta’s legacy for property centered, one way or another, in 
the individualist-absolutist story. 
We have heard this individualist-absolutist story told repeatedly 
over a very long time: property as choice structured to suit the 
interests and preferences of the individual, with that power of choice 
and control protected against all others, including the sovereign. It 
has become, more than anything else, a metaphor for the liberal 
conception of property; the same conception that the Supreme Court 
adverts to and relies upon again and again, just as Chief Justice 
Roberts did most recently in Horne.185 The image of the medieval 
forest represents, visually, that metaphor. But while romantic, that 
image is misleading and false. 
The metaphor of Magna Carta as individualist-absolutist 
property is misleading and false because it represents only half the 
story—the other half is told by the Great Charter’s lost sister, the 
Forest Charter. Without the Forest Charter’s story, a necessary 
dimension of the freedom and liberty of property—the obligation 
towards others and towards the community—is neglected. The Forest 
Charter forces us to find a new metaphor, one that represents the 
dual stories of property as both individualist-absolutist and as 
community-obligation. This Section suggests replacing the metaphor 
in the form of an image that would have been very familiar to Kings 
John and Henry III, to the barons who forced their hands,186 and to 
most other people alive at the time that those kings set their seals 
upon Magna Carta and the Forest Charter: it is the image of the 
Green Man. 
We scarcely hear of the Green Man today, but in medieval times 
the Green Man was found in churches and public buildings.187 The 
careful observer can still see some of the surviving Green Men in 
European churches and public buildings today.188 So what is the 
Green Man? To begin, the Green Man is plural, for there is no one 
image of the Green Man, but many variants, which can be classed into 
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three broad types.189 First, the Green Man of late Roman architecture, 
comprising “foliate heads, which were faces actually formed of leaves, 
foliate masks—faces composed of leaves.”190 The second appears in 
the earliest known Christian example, from the French town of 
Poitiers, in which “the face generates the foliage, in this case from the 
nose, but later more usually from the mouth, and occasionally from 
the ears, and even, grimly, in a few, from the eyes.”191 Finally, in 
others “the face is set amongst the foliage, like fruit, and this type 
shades away into marginal examples which might just be faces ringed 
with decorative leaves.”192 One also finds Green Women and some 
green animals.193 An excellent example of the Green Man is that 
found in the Bamberg Cathedral in Germany, an image of which 
greets us at the start of this Section. 
But what is important for present purposes is the fact that the 
Green Man is both “an image and an idea. It is an image of a human 
face associated with foliage, and it is the idea that makes real the 
connection between humanity and nature. The image personifies the 
idea.”194 The Green Man captures the idea of both the individual and 
the community: “within each human psyche there is that which each 
of us feels to be ‘I’, the ego, which is the incarnation of the psyche. 
The Green Man is an expression of this.”195 But more than this, “the 
consciousness of the individual, set in this mortal vehicle, is the union 
of the timeless with time, in a circle of birth, death and renewal. The 
Green Man is an expression of this.”196 And so, “the idea of the Green 
Man is an Archetype: it is the practical incarnation of the reality that 
All is One.”197 The Green Man is a synthesis of individual and 
community and of humanity and creation-nature-environment. The 
individual cannot be understood as being separate from the 
community; humanity cannot be understood as separable from the 
environment. They are inseparable; they are one; they are 
constitutive of one another; they are a synthesis. 
Increasingly, the Green Man as the idea, the archetype, of the 
synthesis of individual-community and humanity-environment has 
been identified with “seeing the world as a whole in a way that no 
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previous generation has done, and [which will] demand reforms as a 
whole.”198 Thus, the Green Man serves as a “symbol [having] great 
value and great potential as a catalyst in the self-revelation of the 
community and the self-realisation of the individual, and, arising from 
those, the regeneration of nature that we have so damaged.”199 The 
synthesis embodied in the Green Man, then, represents a visual 
metaphor or archetype of the integration of the individual-community 
as humanity within the environment, demonstrating the oneness of 
the three. 
This visual metaphor of community and obligation serves to 
counter, but not to obviate, the metaphor of the individual and rights 
found in the image of the medieval forest. The two metaphors are not 
and cannot be separate. The “green” of the Green Man comes from 
the foliage of the forest, thus linking the two images through our 
relationship to the world in which we live. Both individual choice and 
obligation towards the community are linked through the subject of 
our choices, the tangible and intangible things—the environment in 
which we live—that are subject to the concept of property. 
In the same way that the individual and the community ought not 
be separated but are linked in the visual metaphor of the Green Man, 
the two stories of Magna Carta’s legacy for property ought not be 
read separately. Rather, the two are linked in their common 
treatment of property—thus, they must be read together, as they were 
intended to be. What might such a reading mean for our own time? 
B. Using the Green Man as a Tool for Reading the Stories Together 
How, then, might we read together the two stories of property 
emerging from a full reading of Magna Carta’s legacy for property in 
our own time? This Section uses the metaphor of the Green Man as a 
means of revealing the inseparability of the individual, the 
community, and the environment. We have seen that two property 
stories emerge from Magna Carta and the Forest Charter; the one 
associated with the former supports the individual, while the one 
found in the latter reminds us of the community. The Green Man asks 
us to read these stories as if they were one; in the same way that the 
individual and the community are inseparable, so, too, are the two 
stories of property. Thus, reading the two stories together teaches a 
very simple lesson: property, while comprising the power of choice to 
suit one’s own personal preferences and interests, must do more than 
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simply serve the needs of one person—the king at the time of Magna 
Carta, the individual in modern liberal vernacular. Property must 
also, in addition to its individualist-absolutist leanings, serve the needs 
of the community, the members of which, by right, share in the 
control and use of the resources required to survive. Community is, in 
short, central to what property is. 
And, as we have seen, with the recognition of community comes 
obligation. The right to commons is the core of the Forest Charter’s 
emphasis on obligation, which is something that might seem radical if 
all we can hear is Magna Carta telling us that property is individualist-
absolutist. But if we allow ourselves to think that way, we must 
remember that any feeling of radicalism we might have in recognizing 
obligation as central to property comes only as a consequence of 
failing to understand the dual importance of Magna Carta and the 
Forest Charter. But that is to be expected when the second story, that 
of community and obligation, has been so fully silenced for so long. 
Having then recognized that the two stories are indispensable, 
that community and obligation form part of the core of freedom and 
liberty, we can see that property today, as in King John and King 
Henry III’s day, must serve the general welfare: 
Although the state may come into being to protect private 
property, a strong case exists that property serves the general 
welfare or common good and that individual ownership in our 
nation is not an end in itself but the way society gives incentive 
to the resource creation that establishes maximum conditions 
for benefiting society. The American republic does not exist to 
protect the individual owner as resource solipsist but to protect 
all owners in their common interest, in short, to protect the 
general welfare.200 
The Forest Charter provides us with both an old and a new story of 
property, one which supplements, but does not replace, the 
individualist-absolutist one we have heard for so long in Magna Carta. 
Leaving them apart impoverishes both documents. Read together, 
“[t]he lasting legacy of the Charter of the Forest is the precedent for 
community stewardship of shared resources that endures into the 
twenty-first century.”201 When read as one, Magna Carta and the 
Forest Charter tell a story of property (what we now call the liberal 
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conception (read: individualist-absolutist)) as including obligation 
towards the community. 
What might this mean in the context of the environment and 
climate change? The next and final Section offers three reflections in 
answer to this question by considering the potential of the Forest 
Charter’s story of property as community-obligation in order to 
balance the individualist-absolutist story that allows the choices 
driving anthropogenic climate change. 
C. Community-Obligation and Anthropogenic Climate Change 
Once we begin to see community as central to the choices that 
are made by the individual pursuant to private property, then we can 
see that obligation may be either self-imposed or imposed by the state 
through regulation. In either case, this is a modification of the liberal 
conception of property, which otherwise views the state’s role as 
protecting the individual’s choices against the predation of others, 
including the government; and this story is the one told for Magna 
Carta by contemporary American law. Yet the story told of Magna 
Carta was clearly not the core of the Forest Charter’s story—the 
other half of the joint story of private property told by Magna Carta 
and the Forest Charter. To return to the example used earlier, 
anthropogenic climate change, it is possible to map out how private 
property might change to account for community-obligation, but what 
one might hope for can be summarized in three reflections. 
First, recognizing community and obligation as part of Magna 
Carta’s legacy for property would mean that we recognize how 
property, seen as merely individual and rights, allows us to 
countenance unequal distributions of power—choice—in the control 
and use of resources.202 Those concentrations of power or choice in 
the control and use of resources not only result in inequalities within 
the state, but also among states, allowing for a small number of 
people in a small number of states to negatively affect vast numbers 
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of others beyond those boundaries.203 Climate change, seen through 
the lens of an individualist-absolutist conception of property, sets this 
failure squarely before us.204 If we are committed to adopting the 
Forest Charter as part of Magna Carta’s legacy, we might hope that 
the way property is understood would redress this imbalance of 
power and therefore take greater account of the externalities of 
climate change flowing from those choices that carry with them 
extrajurisdictional reach—those that extend beyond boundaries 
founded upon ideas of national sovereignty. 
Second, and following from the first reflection, the Forest 
Charter’s story of community and obligation might lead us to 
recognize the only community that truly matters today: the global 
community. Climate change is the best indicator of what this global 
community might be. Again, there is no doubt that climate change is a 
truly global phenomena—it involves global interaction and 
interdependence that concerns all humankind.205 The liberal 
conception of private property, however—the conception said to be 
supported by Magna Carta—rarely explores how such 
extrajurisdictional decisions or choices taken by one who holds 
private property visit their consequences not only on those within the 
jurisdiction that creates and sustains private property (i.e., the state), 
but also on those without, forming what we might refer to as an 
interjurisdictional community. Viewed in the global context of climate 
change, private property begins to look rather asymmetrical.206 
What do we mean by “asymmetry?” Simply this: the nature of 
choices as matched against the externalities involved in climate 
change are not limited by national boundaries, as assumed by the 
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liberal concept of private property. The effects of choice exercised in 
one jurisdiction, the decision to use one form of energy, for instance, 
or to drive a car rather than ride a bike, produce greenhouse gases 
that drive anthropogenic climate change. Those consequences go 
beyond the borders of the jurisdiction that made the choice possible. 
In short, private property makes choices possible that have 
consequences far beyond the jurisdictional limits of the systems that 
created the possibility of such choices.207 Combined with the fact that 
the largest holdings of private property are concentrated in 
industrialized or industrializing nations—such as the United States 
and most Western European nations—and those most vulnerable and 
affected by the consequences are those living in the underdeveloped 
and third world—such as the South Pacific Island nations208—the far-
reaching consequences of private property render misguided any 
focus on physical borders and national boundaries as capable of 
limiting the reach of the effects of private property choices. 
Thus, asymmetry refers to the situation that occurs when the 
consequences of private property choices are visited on those beyond 
the jurisdictional reach of the legal structures that creates, confers, 
and protects those choices. This is the case when faced with any 
global phenomena; here we merely happen to be concerned with 
anthropogenic climate change. Thus, again, if we are committed to 
adopting the Forest Charter’s story, we may be willing to see our 
community as somewhat larger than we might have once considered 
it. In short, it encompasses all people on the planet today. 
But yet, there is a third reflection through which we may extend 
the notion of community one step further: a model of private 
property that takes account of the global consequences of climate 
change might also extend the notion of community not only to all 
other humans on the planet, but also to the environment as a whole. 
In other words, our notion of community might account for what 
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William Twining calls an ecocentric focus.209 Anthropocentric actions 
are those the reasons for which are the provision of a benefit to 
human beings, while ecocentric ones are those for which the reason is 
the provision of a benefit to the environment. 
Twining argues that while most canonical jurists are not 
indifferent to environmental concerns and do not treat ecocentric 
reasons as invalid, typically they seem to be anthropocentric in their 
focus.210 There is a growing body of scholarship surrounding what has 
come to be known as “earth jurisprudence” that supports such claims 
about community.211 Of course, there is little doubt that changing the 
way we relate to the environment through law would be difficult, but 
perhaps it is not impossible.212 Charles Taylor identifies some epochal 
moments in human history where political shifts have occurred—the 
most notable being “the great founding revolutions of our 
contemporary world, the American and the French.”213 In one, the 
transition was smooth and less catastrophic because the idealization 
of popular sovereignty was easy to connect with an existing practice 
of popular election. In the other, however, the inability to translate 
the same idealization into a stable and agreed upon set of practices 
led to great conflict for over a century.214 Taylor sees such changes as 
possible when 
people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices. 
These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first 
articulated in [a] theory; this outlook is the context that gives 
sense to the practices. And hence the new understanding comes 
to be accessible to the participants in a way it wasn’t before. It 
begins to define the contours of their world, and can eventually 
come to count as the taken-for-granted shape of things, too 
obvious to mention.215 
Could the environment in our time be akin to the political 
relationships of the American and French revolutions? Perhaps. It is 
not impossible to imagine that climate change could become for the 
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postmodern world a “revolution” not unlike that witnessed in the 
United States and France in the eighteenth century, taking us beyond 
the liberalism that emerged from those revolutions. Charles Reich, 
writing forty-five years ago in a book seemingly forgotten today, said: 
There is a revolution coming. It will not be like revolutions of 
the past. It will originate with the individual and with culture, 
and it will change the political structure only as its final act. It 
will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be 
successfully resisted by violence. It is now spreading with 
amazing rapidity, and already our laws, our institutions and 
social structure are changing in consequence. It promises a 
higher reason, a more human community and a new liberal 
individual. Its ultimate creation will be a new and enduring 
wholeness and beauty—a renewed relationship of man to 
himself, to other men, to society, to nature and to the land.216 
While it would be a radical step to advance our notion of 
community so far as to include not only humanity, but also the 
environment, it would certainly be a step supported by the Forest 
Charter, which, it has been said, may very well be one of the first 
pieces of environmental legislation, developed to remedy unfair 
governance of natural resources.217 Such a conception of the 
community would certainly be in keeping then with the spirit of the 
Forest Charter’s story of community and obligation. As J. C. Holt 
wrote about the legacy of Magna Carta: 
Later generations may have differed on what the community 
was and on who was entitled to represent it, but they were 
rarely in any doubt that authority should be subject to law 
which the community itself defined.218 
Magna Carta’s legacy is one that includes both the individual and the 
community; the Forest Charter comprises an important, but 
forgotten, part of that legacy, reminding us that the community plays 
a central role in Magna Carta’s conception of individual freedom. The 
environment, too, formed a part of the Forest Charter’s conception of 
the community good. Just as the Forest Charter’s story of property 
cannot be separated from Magna Carta’s, so also its conception of the 
community cannot exclude protection of the environment. 
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CONCLUSION 
So, what should we do in two years? The vista of medieval forest 
at the outset of this Article reminds us of Magna Carta’s well-known 
story of the individual and rights. The gaze of a medieval Green Man 
here at the conclusion invites us to listen again to the Forest Charter’s 
story of community and obligation. What, then, should we do in 2017? 
The answer, I hope, is obvious: we ought to reject what Lord Faulks 
said in the House of Lords on June 18, 2015, and we ought to gather 
to commemorate the eight hundredth anniversary of a document 
every bit as important as Magna Carta—without which Magna Carta’s 
story of property is not only incomplete but also misleading. 
Just as the Green Man tells us that the individual and the 
community are one, so too are Magna Carta and the Forest Charter. 
Together, they tell us that we can fully understand property only 
when we see the individual within the context of the community. The 
eight hundredth anniversary in 2017 of Henry III setting his seal on 
Magna Carta’s lost sister seems a good time to hear that story again. 
